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Abstract 
Ireland has had one of the most catastrophic experiences of financial crisis in the developed world, 
in the wake of the global financial crisis of 2008. Unlike the US or Britain though, Ireland’s 
enormous banking exposure was almost entirely related to property speculation and to the 
unchecked domestic housing bubble of the preceding ten years. This paper analyses the conditions 
that led to the crisis, taking account of patterns of corporate governance, regulatory institutions 
and practices, and the linkages between the banking sector and the political system.    2 | P a g e  
 
Introduction 
Ireland has had one of the most catastrophic experiences of financial crisis in the developed world. 
Along with Iceland and Latvia, also small and open economies, Ireland saw a dramatic increase in 
bank lending, credit extension practices, and other banking activities in the years preceding the 
international crisis of 2008. And as in these other two countries, a great deal of this bank 
borrowing came from international markets.  
The over-extension of domestic bank lending had already become apparent during 2007 and 2008, 
as bank share prices faltered even prior to the fall of Lehman Brothers in the US. In the face of the 
impending collapse of the domestic banking sector in late September 2008, at a  panicked all-night 
meeting, the then Fianna Fáil-Green coalition government gave a blanket guarantee not only to 
depositors but to all bond-holders of the six main domestic financial institutions. At that point, the 
Minister for Finance, Brian Lenihan, claimed that this would constitute ‘the cheapest bank rescue 
in history’ (Carswell, 2008). But the government had stumbled blindly into unknown and rapidly 
escalating commitments. The enormous scale of the banks’ losses unfolded over the following 
three years. The cost to the taxpayers of bank recapitalization was eventually estimated at 
approximately €62.8bn (Minister for Finance, 2011); Ireland’s total GDP in 2011 was €155bn 
(Central Bank, 2012). Almost half of these losses are attributable to a single bank, Anglo Irish Bank, 
which (along with the Irish Nationwide Building Society) is now re-titled Irish Bank Resolution 
Corporation Limited (IBRC). Most of the remaining losses were incurred by the two oldest banks, 
the Bank of Ireland, and Allied Irish Bank. A London hedge-fund manager stated that ‘Anglo Irish 
was probably the world’s worst bank. Even worse than the Icelandic banks’ (Lewis, 2011). The 3 | P a g e  
 
incoming Governor of the Central Bank, Patrick Honohan, concluded in May 2010 that this was 
‘one the costliest banking crises in history’ (Burke-Kennedy, 2011).  
The collapse of the banking system caused confidence in the Irish economy to plummet. Ireland 
was forced to enter an EU-IMF loan programme in November 2010. By then, the systemic 
implications of the Irish financial sector liabilities for the European banking system meant that the 
Irish government came under extreme and sustained pressure not to reverse the bank guarantee 
(Beesley, 2011). The private debts of the failed banks were nationalized; the Irish taxpayers would 
be saddled with the crushing burden of debt. It has been argued that ‘Other countries have 
benefited from the Irish socialization of a large share of bank losses, which has significantly 
contributed to the explosion of Irish public debt’ (Darvas, 2011: 16). A large proportion of the non-
performing loans of the struggling banks was taken into public management (through the National 
Asset Management Agency, or NAMA), at a sizeable discount, though still potentially over-valued: 
while the ultimate value of commercial property remained unknown, residential house prices fell 
by 47 per cent between 2007 and 2011 (CSO, 2012). The general public debt soared from 25 per 
cent of GDP in 2006 to 107 per cent at the end of 2011 (Central Bank, 2012). This figure was 
expected to peak at 118 per cent of GDP (and over 130 per cent of GNP
1) in 2013 before starting 
to decline thereafter (International Monetary Fund, 2011: 14). This figure includes €30bn of 
promissory notes to distressed financial institutions. The national debt, net of the bank liabilities, 
                                                           
1 GNP or GNI is generally taken to be a better guide to the state’s fiscal capacity in Ireland, in view of the 
scale of transfer pricing and profit repatriation in the export-oriented multinational sector. See, for example, 
Hennigan, M. (2010a) Ireland: GDP or GNP? Which is the better measure of economic performance?, 
Finfacts, Thursday 10 March 2011. http://www.finfacts-blog.com/2011/03/ireland-gdp-or-gnp-which-is-
better.html. 4 | P a g e  
 
stood at 60 per cent of GDP in 2010 (Central Statistics Office, 2011: 152). The cost of servicing the 
national debt increased by over €1.1 billion in 2011 to reach €5.4 billion, accounting for 16% of 
overall tax receipts (Central Bank, 2012). 
How had such a calamitous situation come about? In this chapter, we show first that the 
conditions that gave rise to the crisis, while precipitated by international events, were primarily 
domestic in origin. We then trace and evaluate a number of factors that contributed to these 
disastrous outcomes. 
Understanding the crisis 
Three official reports provide much of the framework required for understanding what happened 
in the Irish financial system
2. The first report involved an examination of the conduct of the 
banking sector in the run-up to the crisis. Klaus Regling and Max Watson were commissioned by 
the Minister for Finance in February 2010 to conduct a preliminary investigation into the crisis in 
the banking system in Ireland.
 The objective of the investigation was ‘to consider the international 
economic and financial environment, and indeed any broader social developments, which 
provided the context for the recent crisis in the banking sector.’ A central part of their brief was to 
identify any factors particular to the Irish banking system which ‘exacerbated the impact of the 
international financial crisis for Ireland’ and to highlight the areas in relation to the conduct, 
management and corporate governance of individual institutions which required further 
investigation (Minister for Finance, 2010).  
                                                           
2 For a note on the authors of these reports, see the Commission of Investigation into the Banking Sector in 
Ireland, http://www.bankinginquiry.gov.ie/Biographies.aspx  5 | P a g e  
 
A second report was commissioned at the same time from Professor Patrick Honohan, an 
academic economist who had been appointed to the position of Governor of the Central Bank and 
Financial Services Authority of Ireland, as it was then titled, in 2009. His brief was to investigate 
the performance of the respective functions of the Central Bank and Financial Regulator over the 
period from the establishment of the Financial Regulator in 2003 to the end of September 2008.
 
The Government indicated its intention to use these two reports to produce the terms of 
reference for a statutory Commission of Investigation, to be established pursuant to the 
Commissions of Investigation Act 2004. Both reports were published in May 2010 (Honohan, 2010; 
Regling and Watson, 2010).  
In September 2010, the Commission of Investigation (Banking Sector) was established, comprising 
one member, Mr. Peter Nyberg, with a mandate to examine why a number of public and private 
institutions had acted in an imprudent or ineffective manner during the period 1 January 2003 to 
15 January 2009. The Commission’s Report was published in April 2011 (Nyberg, 2011).  
All three reports address the international developments that facilitated the crisis, but they are 
also unanimous in identifying peculiarly Irish causal factors: 
Although international pressures contributed to the timing, intensity and depth of the Irish 
banking crisis, the essential characteristic of the problem was domestic and classic 
(Honohan, 2010: 22). 
Ireland’s banking crisis bears the clear imprint of global influences, yet it was in crucial ways 
‘home-made’ (Regling and Watson, 2010: 5). 6 | P a g e  
 
International developments, however, did not in themselves cause the crisis though they 
helped precipitate it. The problems causing the crisis as well as the scale of it were the result 
of domestic Irish decisions and actions, some of which were made more profitable or 
possible by international developments  (Nyberg, 2011: ii). 
The principal causes of the collapse of the Irish financial do not centre on the proliferation of 
complex financial products or of exposure to the US sub-prime mortgage market. Rather, this was 
‘a plain vanilla property bubble, compounded by exceptional concentrations of lending for 
purposes related to property – and notably commercial property’ (Regling and Watson, 2010: 6). 
In order to put this into context, we need to consider the rather modest origins of banking in 
Ireland, and the consequences of the banks having almost unlimited access to credit after Ireland 
joined the Euro in 1999. We need to understand how the expansion of the financial services sector 
shaped the regulatory regime and its implementation. We also need to consider why property 
loomed so large as an investment product in Irish life, and the broader political context in which 
banks were not only permitted but enabled to take huge risks: we shall return to this briefly at the 
end of the chapter. 
The role of the banks in the Irish economy 
The financial services sector was a relatively new phenomenon in the Irish economy: until the 
1980s, the principal banks were domestic in ownership, running relatively small-scale operations 
by international standards (though they were among the larger companies in the Irish economy). 
The six main domestic financial institutions over the last thirty years were Bank of Ireland, Allied 
Irish Bank (AIB), Anglo Irish Bank (‘Anglo’), Irish Nationwide Building Society (INBS), Irish Life and 7 | P a g e  
 
Permanent (IL&P) and Educational Building Society (EBS). A key preoccupation of Irish policy-
makers prior to the boom of the 1990s, following ‘vocal criticism from consumer groups’, was the 
danger of too little competition in the domestic banking market leading to too little credit (Nyberg, 
2011: 28). 
Indeed, credit rationing was long a familiar feature in both the domestic mortgage and commercial 
lending markets. Ireland has unusually high levels of home ownership, and therefore high levels of 
demand for personal mortgages. The historian J.J. Lee has noted a ‘possessor principle’ as a 
recurring trait in Irish public discourse, which he traces to older remembered experiences of 
dispossession and the land-hunger associated with agricultural consolidation in the wake of the 
mid-nineteenth century Famine (Lee, 1989). Whatever the deep-seated cultural reasons may be, 
investment in property, both private and commercial, has conventionally been taken to be a 
prudent strategy yielding long-term gains in value. In Ireland even more so than in Britain, people 
took to heart the notion that an undertaking could be ‘as safe as houses’. Moreover, close 
connections between the state and the construction industry had been established early on in the 
life of the independent Irish state, led by the dominant political party, Fianna Fáil (Dunphy, 1995). 
Public housing projects were not only a popular investment in quality of life, but they were a 
recurring source of stimulus in an economy that, until the early 1990s, lagged at about 60 per cent 
of average European GDP (Bradley, 2000; FitzGerald, 2000). 
During the 1980s, the international trend toward liberalization of capital controls began to change 
the policy context of banking in Ireland in two ways. Firstly, the Building Societies Act 1989 
permitted building societies to expand the scope of their lending activities. Two building societies 
– INBS and EBS – which had previously focused on providing residential mortgages, were now 8 | P a g e  
 
empowered to make loans for, inter alia, residential housing development. INBS, and to a lesser 
extent EBS, entered the development finance market where interest margins and fees were 
greater and greater profits could be earned. A third building society, IL&P, reacted to the 
increased competition and falling margins by increased lending volumes. The 1989 Act and 
subsequent amendments facilitated such expansion by permitting building societies to raise 
wholesale funding, allowing them to increase their loan books at a faster rate than their deposit 
funding would have permitted (Nyberg, 2011: 23).  
Secondly, in the late 1980s, Taoiseach (that is, Prime Minister) Charles J. Haughey saw an 
opportunity to take advantage of the liberalization of financial services that had begun to 
accelerate in the wake of the deregulation of the City of London, and the growing volumes of 
internationally mobile speculative and investment capital then becoming available. He extended 
the country’s preferential corporate tax regime to the financial sector, and created the Irish 
Financial Services Sector (IFSC) as an international hub of traded financial services (Cooper, 2010). 
This proved a highly successful strategy, and within a few years the IFSC included subsidiaries of a 
broad range of the major international financial institutions. Many of these were providing 
ancillary services to London headquarters. Relatively few were providing services to the domestic 
Irish market.  But the significance of the IFSC was considerable, as we shall see later, in shaping the 
priorities of the Irish regulatory regime. 
By the mid-1990s, Ireland had begun to emerge from the recession that had dominated the 1980s. 
A combination of benign conditions following the ratification of the Single European Act in 1992 
allowed Ireland to engage in a period of very rapid economic growth: the ‘Celtic Tiger’ era lasted 
from about 1994 until the crash in 2008 (Honohan and Walsh, 2002; Barry, 1999). Ireland had 9 | P a g e  
 
stabilized its earlier macroeconomic imbalances; social partnership contributed to keeping wage 
increases under control. The long-standing policy mix favourable to foreign direct investment 
created new opportunities for footloose foreign capital in growing high-tech sectors, especially 
pharmaceuticals and information and communications technology, to locate in Ireland in order to 
gain access to European markets (MacSharry and White, 2000; Ó Riain, 2004). 
But the Celtic Tiger phase in Irish economic history falls into two phases. The first phase runs to 
about 2002, by which time it was already becoming apparent that the domestic economic was 
overheating, and house prices were starting to rise rapidly. The second phase, from 2002 to 2008, 
is a period during which economic activity came to be dominated much more by property-related 
activity. What made the key difference was the availability of cheap credit that followed upon 
Ireland’s membership of the Euro. 
The Euro and access to cheap credit 
In January 1999, Ireland together with ten other members of the EU including France, Italy, and 
Germany, adopted the Euro as their common currency. Regling and Watson posed the somewhat 
rhetorical question, ‘Was it a coincidence that Ireland's economic fundamentals began to 
deteriorate when Ireland joined the Eurosystem?’ (Regling and Watson, 2010: 33).  As early as 
June 2001, the Bank of International Settlements (BIS) observed in its annual report that ‘the 
expansion of credit is an essential ingredient in the build-up of imbalances in the financial system 
and in any concomitant excessive accumulation or misallocation of real capital’ (D'Arista, 2006: 
222). There is no doubt that the huge property boom that developed in Ireland during the 2000s 
was fuelled by the greater availability to the Irish banks of cheap finance. Membership of the 
Eurozone led to a decrease in nominal and real interest rates and also removed the exchange risk 10 | P a g e  
 
previously associated with European borrowing. As a result, Irish banks became increasingly 
reliant on wholesale short-term borrowing in the Euro area. By the end of 2006, wholesale 
borrowing by Ireland in the Euro area markets for the aforementioned six Irish financial 
institutions reached about 39 per cent of the combined loan books. The growth in short-term 
borrowing increased at an even greater rate, such that ‘securities of one year remaining maturity 
or less amounted to €41bn at end 2006 for the two largest banks, up from €11.1bn at end 2003’ 
(Regling and Watson, 2010: 33). 
The other side of borrowing, of course, is lending. The countries of the European periphery – 
Ireland, Spain, Portugal, and Greece – which as impoverished regions had previously been in 
receipt of Structural Funds to assist their development, now appeared to offer handsome returns 
on investments. These countries in effect became akin to emergent economies in the Eurozone 
context, and lenders were more than willing to accommodate their borrowing requirements. 
Given the shortage of other good investment opportunities, the money was channelled 
predominantly into property development in Ireland; Spain experienced a similar phenomenon 
The absence of Euro-wide regulatory and oversight arrangements meant that lenders as well as 
domestic borrowers were vulnerable to the illusion that has preceded all property-related 
financial crashes, such as in East Asia in 1998 for example, that ‘this time is different’ (Reinhart and 
Rogoff, 2009).  
Consumers expected that the combination of lower interest rates and increased competition in 
the market would increase choice, create more flexible financing packages, reduce the likelihood 
of overcharging, and improve what was perceived to be a protracted and cumbersome loan 
approval process for mortgages. All the main Irish banks began to make tracker mortgages 11 | P a g e  
 
available, as well as 100 per cent loan-to-value loans. Interestingly, it was noted that ‘these 
developments were viewed by the authorities overwhelmingly in terms of a benign shift to a 
modernized and competitive market – one that was in tune with developments in the UK and US’ 
(Regling and Watson, 2010: 29).  
The greatest demand for credit from the Irish banks and building societies came from builders and 
property developers. Competition between the Irish lending institutions intensified, as they strove 
to hold their share of a rapidly expanding market. This led to a significant change in the process of 
lending as domestic institutions, seeking to differentiate themselves, began to offer more 
streamlined loan approval processes. This was particularly marked at Anglo Irish Bank, where it 
was noted for example that ‘the lending culture was such that when applications were 
problematic, the mindset was ‘there is a “yes” in there somewhere’ (Nyberg, 2011: 32). 
Considering itself ‘a relationship lender’, Anglo was clearly reluctant to refuse loans to its top 
customers, particularly when competitors were all to ready to take over these loans. As Anglo’s 
profits soared, the larger and more traditional commercial banks, Bank of Ireland and Allied Irish 
Bank, came under intense pressure to relax their own loan approval and risk assessment practices 
in a struggle to keep pace with Anglo’s performance. Nyberg indicated that in an environment 
where the supply of credit available exceeded good quality loan demand, banks relaxed their 
lending standards. He found evidence in Anglo of deviations from lending guidelines, resulting in 
approval of loans unsupported by appropriate cash flows and secured by non recourse personal 
guarantees or guarantees supported by equity in other already leveraged property (Nyberg, 2011: 
32).  12 | P a g e  
 
The result of these lending strategies was a threefold concentration of assets on the balance 
sheets of the Irish banks. This featured ‘loans to the property sector in general; loans to 
commercial property specifically; and within this latter group, development loans to interests 
associated with a limited number of key developers of commercial property’ (Regling and Watson, 
2010: 31). Property-related lending soared between 2002 and 2008.  
Domestic property-related lending increased by almost €200bn which represents 80 per 
cent of all growth in credit. This raised the share of property-related lending from under 45 
per cent of total credit in December 2002 to over 60 per cent in December 2008  (Nyberg, 
2011: 14). 
The effect was to give an enormous boost to the construction industry. The second half of the 
Celtic Tiger period, which ran from 2002 to 2008, was exceptionally dependent on construction 
activity as a classic property bubble developed. ‘Competitiveness didn’t matter – from now on we 
were going to get rich building houses for each other’, economist Morgan Kelly commented with 
heavy irony (Lewis, 2011). The construction sector accounted for about 20 per cent of GNP in 
2006, compared with an OECD average of about 10 per cent, and employment in construction 
soared to about 20 per cent of the workforce, also twice the international average. House prices 
rose rapidly, even as planning permission was granted for a rash of new housing developments 
(Kelly, 2009b). ‘Irish banks were lending forty per cent more in real terms to property developers 
alone in 2008 than they had been lending to everyone in Ireland in 2000, and seventy-five per cent 
more as mortgages’ (Kelly, 2009a: 2). 13 | P a g e  
 
The banks over-extended their lending on a vast scale. Net foreign liabilities of Irish banks stood at 
10 per cent in 2003, but 60 per cent in 2008. All this activity generated a boost in revenue flows to 
the government: at its peak, revenues directly related to property accounted for some 15 per cent 
of total revenues, more than twice the OECD average. Government used the bonanza to narrow 
and weaken the income tax base as part of its ongoing commitment to a strategy of reduction in 
personal tax liabilities (Dellepiane and Hardiman, 2012). This left it particularly exposed to the 
emergence of a significant fiscal deficit when the crash eventually came.  
Explaining the fall of the Irish banks 
How had things gone so badly wrong? A number of considerations need to be taken into account. 
The most obvious place to start is to consider the role of market disciplines in keeping corporate 
performance on track: evidently something in the Irish experience proved defective. Furthermore, 
the spectacular crash of the Irish banks suggests something was seriously problematic in the 
regulatory regime governing the financial sector, whether in the regulatory powers, the 
institutions, or their implementation. Finally, consideration of these issues leads us to reflect upon 
the wider political context of the expansion of the financial sector, noting in particular the close 
relationships between politicians, builders, and bankers that developed during the 2000s.  
 
The market for corporate control as a disciplining force 
The market for corporate control theory (‘MCC’), first proposed by Henry Manne in 1965, suggests 
that mismanagement is reflected in share price because shareholders sell their shares rather than 
replace management (Manne, 1965). An opportunity thus arises for a bidder to acquire the 14 | P a g e  
 
company cheaply, replace the inefficient managers and turn the company around.  The MCC 
suggests that takeovers have a disciplinary effect on managers. As recently as 2008, Manne has 
argued that if there is a competitive market for corporate control, there will be no need for any of 
the other mechanisms for corporate governance other than those voluntarily adopted by 
contracts and norms (Manne, 2008). 
 Share ownership in Ireland is relatively widely dispersed. Applying MCC to the credit institution 
market suggests that the share prices of the listed institutions should have dropped to reflect their 
increasingly poor risk management and corporate governance and consequently the institutions 
should have been acquired and improved. Yet this did not happen in Ireland or indeed abroad until 
the latter part of 2007. It has been argued elsewhere that the fundamental prerequisites for the 
operation of this disciplinary force were not in place (Clarke, 2009). The share prices of the banks 
did not reflect the inefficiencies which subsequently proved so costly to the global market. 
Investors did not act in a rational fashion, and there was evidence of ‘irrational exuberance’ and 
information asymmetries. Lord Turner, the Financial Services Authority Chairman, in his report on 
bank regulation to the British Chancellor of the Exchequer, acknowledged that all liquid traded 
markets are capable of acting irrationally, and can be susceptible to self-reinforcing herd and 
momentum effects. He commented that ‘A reasonable conclusion is that market discipline 
expressed via market prices cannot be expected to play a major role in constraining bank risk 
taking, and that the primary constraint needs to come from regulation and supervision’ (Lord 
Turner, 2009: 47).  
It is interesting to note, however, that some commentators suggest that the market for corporate 
control operated in a perverse manner. Lord Turner himself suggested that falling spreads and 15 | P a g e  
 
volatility prices drove up the current value of a range of instruments marked to market value on 
the books of the banks and the hedge funds. This led to higher book profits and reinforced 
management and trader certainty that they were ‘pursuing sensible strategies’ (Lord Turner, 2009: 
25). It thus appears that the challenging competitive conditions encouraged rather than restricted 
management, and that the herd mentality referred to above prevented most institutions from 
stepping out of line. Similarly, the Nyberg Commission found that:   
Bank management and boards in some of the other covered banks feared that, if they did 
not yield to the pressure to be as profitable as Anglo, in particular, they would face loss of 
long-standing customers, declining bank value, potential takeover and a loss of professional 
respect  (Nyberg, 2011: v). 
The Irish Takeover Panel is the supervisory authority responsible for monitoring takeovers of Irish 
‘relevant companies’.
3 The vast majority of these companies are Irish registered PLCs listed on the 
Irish Stock Exchange. Takeover activity in Ireland varies from year to year, but overall there is a 
reasonable level of activity. Since its establishment in 1997, there has been an average of 5.3 
takeovers a year, from an annual average of 75 relevant companies. In that time, there have been 
only seven hostile takeover offers (an average of 0.5 a year), and none of these has been 
successful.
4 In three cases, control did not pass and the targets remained independent. On the 
                                                           
3 As defined in section 2 of the Irish Takeover Panel Act, 1997 as amended. 
4 These figures do not include statements of intention to make a possible offer which were not welcomed by 
the target companies and did not lead to offers being made. 16 | P a g e  
 
basis of this evidence, it would appear that the market for corporate control may not be 
particularly robust in Ireland.  
Good corporate governance  
Although market pressures on banks’ activities may have been relatively weak, it might be 
anticipated that self-governance by the banks would ensure that good standards of risk 
assessment prevailed, and that prudential attention was paid to balancing of assets and liabilities 
relative to capitalization. 
Prior to the crisis, a number of different initiatives had been considered, aimed at formalising and 
enforcing good corporate governance. The first involved mandatory directors’ compliance 
statements.  This idea had been suggested by a parliamentary committee examining serious and 
sustained misconduct by banks in facilitating tax evasion (Public Accounts Committee, 2001). Upon 
the specific recommendation of the Review Group on Auditing (Report of the Review Group on 
Auditing, 2000: 25), section 45 of the Companies (Auditing and Accounting) Act, 2003 was 
introduced, requiring company directors to report annually to shareholders on their company’s 
compliance with its obligations under company law, taxation law, and other relevant statutory or 
regulatory requirements. Subsequently, private consultations took place between IFSRA, the 
Department of Finance and industry representatives, during which concerns were expressed about 
the section’s lack of a materiality threshold, its vulnerability to constitutional challenge and its 
potential detrimental impact on competitiveness. As a result of what Honohan described as 
deference to ‘industry pressure’, a decision was taken not to implement section 45 (Honohan, 
2010: 50-51,  note 6). 17 | P a g e  
 
A second initiative involved the introduction of more robust ‘fit and proper’ requirements. This 
stemmed from the finding in 2005 by the Joint Committee on Finance and the Public Service of 
numerous incidents of failure by the banks to comply with ’acceptable standards of behaviour’ 
with respect to prudential consumer and fiscal obligations in the context of customer charges and 
interest rates (Report of the Joint Oireachtas Committee on Finance and the Public Service, 2005: 
9). Patrick Neary, then Chief Executive of IFSRA, commenting on Irish practices of principles-based 
regulation (discussed in greater detail later), accepted that ‘[i]n a principles-based system of 
supervision, the competence and probity of those who direct and manage firms is a critical 
element’ (Neary, 2006). Rules were issued by the IFSRA in 2007 requiring directors and managers 
of regulated market operators to have the necessary qualifications, skills and experience to 
perform the duties of their position and to be honest, fair and ethical. The requirements varied by 
type of financial institution; fitness and probity reviews were not conducted on a statutory basis 
for all firms.  
The third initiative mooted by the Central Bank in 2005 was to introduce a corporate governance 
code for credit institutions and insurance undertakings. The Central Bank prepared a consultation 
paper, and engaged in a pre-consultation with credit institutions in 2005 and 2006. However in 
early 2007, it decided to delay this code, citing the need to develop and possibly incorporate 
within the code organizational requirements arising from recent EU-wide discussions (Honohan, 
2010: 54, note 6). This was unfortunate, as the introduction of the code even at this late stage 
might have shone light on the serious corporate governance deficiencies in some of the 18 | P a g e  
 
institutions prior to the Government’s decision in September 2008 to provide blanket guarantees 
to the banks.
 5 
Across the world, poor corporate governance was identified as a key contributor to the global 
financial crisis. Failures were identified in Ireland, as elsewhere, in terms of risk control and 
remuneration, but the small market and the lack of diversity on the boards appears to have 
exacerbated the problem. Regling and Watson identified four key areas in which bank 
management and governance contributed to the Irish banking crisis. First, management failed to 
appreciate the risk entailed by the significant concentration of bank assets in activities related to 
property, and especially non-household based commercial property, as described above. Secondly, 
lending guidelines and processes appeared to have been quite widely circumvented. The authors 
referred rather benignly to the ‘tidal wave of uncritical enthusiasm … to participate in financing 
the property boom and to maintain market share’ (Regling and Watson, 2010: 35).
6 The Nyberg 
Commission noted that ‘adhering to either formal or traditional, often voluntary, constraints and 
limits on banking and finance, does not seem to have been greatly valued in Ireland during the 
period’ (Nyberg, 2011: 96-7).
  While these two issues point to ineffective corporate governance 
and ineffective risk management within the banks, Irish bankers were clearly not unique in this 
regard (Plath, 2008; Kirkpatrick, 2009; The White House, 2008). A third contributing factor 
involved ‘very specific and serious breaches of basic governance principles concerning identifiable 
                                                           
5 A Corporate Code for Credit Institutions and Insurance Undertakings was introduced and came into effect in 
January 2011. 
6While they asserted that poor liquidity management and funding policy abounded, they accepted that this 
was harder for managers to determine at the time.  19 | P a g e  
 
transactions in specific institutions that went far beyond any question of poor credit assessment.’ 
These included allegations of practices on the part of Anglo Irish Bank of undisclosed loans to 
directors, creative accounting, and loans to investors to purchase their own shares.  
By the time Anglo was nationalized in January 2009, the Government accepted that these 
‘unacceptable corporate governance practices’ were a triggering factor in the nationalization 
(Department of Finance, 2009).  Yet the aforementioned governance failures happened at a time 
when guidelines and processes applied to those financial institutions with a listing on the Irish 
Stock Exchange. The Listing Rules of the Irish Stock Exchange required such companies to comply 
with the Principles set out in the UK Combined Code on Corporate Governance (‘the Combined 
Code’), and to make a disclosure statement either confirming compliance with the provisions or 
explaining any non-compliance.
7 The Combined Code set out main and supporting principles 
relating to directors, remuneration, accountability and audit and relations with shareholders. It 
envisaged ‘an effective board’ operating ‘within a framework of prudent and effective controls 
which enables risk to be assessed and managed’ (Financial Reporting Council, 2006:  note 14, 
section 1A, Supporting Principles 3). Evidence gathered by the Irish Stock Exchange and the Irish 
Association of Investment Managers (‘the ISE/IAIM Study’) indicated a high level of compliance by 
Irish listed companies with the Combined Code (Irish Stock Exchange and Irish Association of 
Investment Managers, 2010). The reason why the Code proved ineffective in this context lies in 
another finding of the ISE/IAIM Study to the effect that much of this compliance involved ‘box 
                                                           
7 The original version of the Combined Code was published in 1998 by the Financial Reporting Council and 
amendments were introduced in 2003, 2006, 2008, and 2010. 
 In 2010, the Code as re-titled the UK 
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ticking’, and that frequently there was no real adherence to the spirit of the Combined Code.  This 
is consistent with the conclusion of Regling and Watson that ‘the failings of corporate governance 
seem to have been much more a problem of deficient implementation than defective guidelines 
and processes’ (Regling and Watson, 2010: 35, note 8). 
The fourth key corporate governance failure identified by Regling and Watson was poor 
remuneration policies which encouraged and rewarded risk-taking. In particular, they criticized 
management bonuses and awards of substantial stock options to top and middle management 
(Regling and Watson, 2010: 35, note 8). This is consistent with research from the UK Financial 
Services Authority which indicated that the structure of bonuses in UK financial institutions 
allowed management to benefit from risk-taking whilst ensuring that any losses were borne by 
long-term shareholders and society (Financial Services Authority, 2009: par. 2.4). In common with 
boards internationally, remuneration in Irish institutions became ‘a driver for excessive risk-
taking’. This policy was not caught by the existing corporate governance rules – while the 
Combined Code emphasized the need for a clear link between pay and performance, it did not 
build in a risk assessment consideration (Financial Reporting Council, 2006: note 14, section B1, 
Main Principles). This explains in part why, despite the fact that it was already suffering a decline 
in its share price, the 2007 Annual Report of Anglo Irish Bank reported that its Chief Executive 
David Drumm held 1.4 million options to subscribe for ordinary shares, and that his total pay for 
the year was €3.3 million, which included a €2 million annual performance bonus.  
Financial regulation  
It is clear that norms of professional conduct have not always provided a sufficient incentive for 
directors to adhere to corporate governance guidelines, and that certain boards were unwilling or 21 | P a g e  
 
unable to challenge the executive or to prevent excessive risk taking. For example, in Anglo, the 
bank with the most spectacular record of failure, Seán Fitzpatrick moved directly from the position 
of Chief Executive to Chairman of the board in contravention of the Combined Code, was a party 
to some questionable accounting in respect of Anglo’s balance sheet, and had multiple conflicts of 
interest in his various business activities (Ross, 2009; McDonald and Sheridan, 2009). 
As noted above, market forces appear to have been exerting weak pressure on banks to perform 
to standards that would have averted catastrophe. Voluntary compliance with standards of good 
corporate governance proved singularly ineffective. This prompts us to consider the regulatory 
regime in place during the 2000s. We shall look first at the structure of the financial regulation 
system in Ireland, to consider whether the institutional design left something to be desired, such 
that the reconfiguration of regulatory powers in the late 1990s created a gap in regulatory 
oversight. We shall then consider the powers of the financial regulator, and the enforcement of 
regulatory requirements. In our view, all of these factors played a role in accounting for the crisis 
in the Irish banking system. But they also need to be understood in a broader political context, 
which we shall return to in the final part of this chapter. 
The structure of the regulatory system 
The scope of financial regulation in Ireland had been progressively increased during the 1990s in 
response to EU Directives (Westrup, 2012). But as there was no EU-mandated institutional form of 
regulation, diverse practices had evolved across EU member states to give effect to the Directives. 
The shortcomings of the pre-1990s regime in Ireland had become apparent on a number of 
occasions.  Banks had turned to government for financial rescue,  for example in 1984, following 
the collapse of the Insurance Corporation of Ireland, a wholly-owned subsidiary of Allied Irish 22 | P a g e  
 
Bank. Relations between bankers and politicians had also become a matter of public comment at 
that time, for example when merchant banker Patrick Gallagher was prosecuted for fraud in 
Northern Ireland, but not in the Republic, where he enjoyed close financial and business links with 
Charles J. Haughey. The dominant issue during the 1990s was the evidence of the banks’ role in 
facilitating systematic tax evasion on the part of their customers, which as noted above was 
subject to a high-profile investigation by the Public Accounts Committee (Public Accounts 
Committee, 2001). 
In 1998, the Government, then composed of a coalition between the dominant Fianna Fáil party 
and the small liberal-leaning Progressive Democrats, agreed in principle to the establishment of a 
single regulatory authority for the financial services sector, and appointed a working group under 
the chairmanship of Michael McDowell (a barrister and prominent Progressive Democrat) to 
advise it on implementation. The report recommended that prudential and consumer protection 
regulation of almost all financial firms should be assigned to a single regulatory authority which 
would be established as an entirely new independent organization (McDowell, 1999). In reaching 
this conclusion, the Group was influenced by the lack of international precedent for combining 
such a large range of regulatory responsibilities within a conventional Central Bank. A new entity, 
it concluded, would provide for clarity of purpose in relation to both regulation and customer 
protection in financial services, and would provide a coherent, robust and transparent approach to 
financial regulation. A minority of the Group disagreed and advised that the single regulatory 
authority should be located within a restructured Central Bank. They advised establishing a 
separate division for prudential and consumer regulation headed up by a person with equal rank 
to the Director General of the Central Bank. Upon consideration of the report, a compromise was 23 | P a g e  
 
reached by the Government, which amounted to a hybrid system. Rather ominously, Regling and 
Watson would later characterize this report as ‘an interesting experiment’ (Regling and Watson, 
2010: 36). A new structure, the Central Bank of Ireland and Financial Services Authority (CBIFSA), 
was established
8 under the chairmanship of the Governor. This body linked a monetary authority 
carrying out functions related to the European System of Central Banks (ESCB), and a single 
regulatory authority entitled the Irish Financial Services Regulatory Authority (IFSRA). The latter 
was responsible for licensing, prudential regulation of both the banking and insurance sectors, and 
consumer protection. It had its own Board, with an independent Chairperson, Chief Executive and 
Consumer Director. The two former post-holders, together with some board members of IFSRA, 
sat on the CBFSAI Board. Members of both boards were drawn from a cross-section of 
professional and public sector groups rather than being ‘expert Central Bankers’ (Honohan, 2010: 
39-40). IFSRA was subject to a duty to act in a manner consistent with the performance by the 
Governor and the Board of their CBFSAI functions (including the Governor’s role in contributing to 
financial stability). The CBFSAI Board was responsible for the efficient and effective co-ordination 
of the constituent parts of the organization as a whole, and for the exchange of information 
between them.
 9 Another of its duties, which was to prove controversial, was ‘to promote the 
development within the State of the financial services industry (but in such a way as not to affect 
the objective of the Bank in contributing to the stability of the State’s financial system).’
10 
                                                           
8 Central Bank and Financial Services Authority of Ireland Act 2003. 
9 S.5A(1)(a) Central Bank Act 1942 as amended. 
10 S.5A(1)(b) Central Bank Act 1942 as amended. See also Honohan 2010,  37. 24 | P a g e  
 
Honohan has suggested that ‘the division of responsibilities between the Governor, the CBFSAI 
and IFSRA was novel and contained the hazard of ambiguous lines of responsibility especially in 
the event of a systemic crisis’ (Honohan, 2010: 36). It encouraged the establishment of 
institutional silos, creating difficulties in ensuring coordination between the economists and the 
regulatory staff involved in regulatory responsibilities.  This problem is highlighted by the view 
expressed to the Nyberg Commission that: 
it was not the primary responsibility of the [CBFSAI] to evaluate possible problems in 
domestic financial markets emanating from the behaviour of individual institutions. [CBFSAI] 
legislation provides that while the [CBFSAI]  was charged with overall financial stability 
matters, the [IFRSA] was responsible for identifying and bringing to the attention of the 
[CBFSAI] any bank-specific/prudential matters of potential system-wide significance. 
Therefore, according to this view, the [CBFSAI] should not question, or be seen as 
questioning, the [IFRSA’s] activities. As the [IFRSA] did not raise any such concerns with the 
[CBFSAI], the [CBFSAI] could therefore not have been expected to detect existing or 
emerging problems. Indeed, it was even suggested that detailed enquiries by the [CBFSAI] 
regarding the basis for the [IFRSA’s] assessments could have been regarded as an 
unacceptable intrusion into the autonomous status of the [IFRSA] (Nyberg, 2011: 66). 
 
Honohan also suggested that the overlap between IFRSA and CBFSAI board membership meant 
that issues within the remit of the IFRSA that fell to be considered also at CBFSAI Board meetings 
would normally have been discussed by the overlapping members beforehand. This, he argued, 25 | P a g e  
 
facilitated IFRSA members voting as a block on matters of importance to the CBFSAI. Finally, he 
suggested that the ‘unduly hierarchical CBFSAI culture’ discouraged challenge (Honohan, 2010: 
16). 
While this system of regulation can be seen to have had a number of weak points, it secured the 
confidence of international observers. The IMF 2006 Financial Sector Assessment Program Report, 
for example, was very positive in its assessment of the new integrated supervisory framework, 
noting that the organizational structure was likely to enhance financial stability (International 
Monetary Fund, 2006). Honohan noted this would have had a significant dissuasive effect on 
concerns that might otherwise have been raised about ‘prudential supervision and the risks to 
financial stability’ (Honohan, 2010: 91). 
Nevertheless, despite these structural problems, Honohan concluded that it would be hard to 
show that the complexity of this regulatory structure materially contributed to the major failures 
that occurred. We need thus to probe deeper into the regulatory regime, to consider the priorities 
it adopted, the scope of its powers, and the way these were implemented. 
Principles-based regulation  
Regling and Watson concluded that ‘the structure of regulation seems to have been less important 
in explaining Ireland’s banking crisis than the way in which supervision was implemented in 
practice’ (Regling and Watson, 2010: 36). While the structure of the regulatory system changed in 
2003, the regulatory approach did not. In common with many other jurisdictions, including the UK, 
the Irish regulatory regime was based on ‘principles-based regulation’. Although this term has 
various meanings (Black, 2008), as applied in Ireland it refers to a system where ‘the prudential 26 | P a g e  
 
regulator is not prescriptive in terms of product design, pricing and the specific risk decisions 
adopted by a firm, as long as that firm has a robust governance structure and an effective 
oversight and control system’ (Honohan, 2010: 44).
  It was also referred to as ‘light-touch 
regulation’ or market-based regulation.  
Such a policy was consistent with the Irish Government’s ‘Better Regulation’ policy, one of the 
principles of which stated: ‘We will regulate as lightly as possible given the circumstances, and use 
more alternatives’ (Department of the Taoiseach, 2004). It is important in this context to note that 
the supervisory approach in Ireland did not become lighter during the 2000s, but that ’it remained 
very accommodating in a radically changed environment’ (Regling and Watson, 2010: 38). 
A problem identified by the Honohan report which was perhaps not so commonplace was that 
‘the underlying philosophy was oriented towards trusting a properly governed firm; it was 
potentially only a short step from that trust to the emergence of a somewhat diffident attitude on 
the part of the regulators so far as challenging the decisions of firms was concerned’ (Honohan, 
2010: 44). In describing the regulatory approach of the Bank prior to the crisis, the word ‘trust’ 
appears repeatedly. The Chairman of IFSRA was reported as stating that ‘for the principles based 
approach to work there must be mutual trust, between ourselves and industry and a shared 
aspiration to do our best together’ (Honohan, 2010: 44). This led to a regulatory approach which 
was ‘excessively deferential and accommodating; insufficiently challenging and not persistent 
enough’ (Honohan, 2010: 16).  
This in effect inhibited the IFSRA from taking quick and decisive action against banks with 
governance issues or with obvious liquidity concerns. While acknowledging that the Banking 27 | P a g e  
 
Supervision Division of the IFSRA may have been under-resourced, the Nyberg Commission 
suggested that resource limitations alone would not account sufficiently for the lack of action: 
The essential information was readily available in the banks’ regulatory returns and (publicly 
available) in annual reports. Also…the serious governance and procedural problems in INBS 
(the Irish Nationwide Building Society), and to a lesser extent in Anglo, were known to the 
[IFSRA] for years. Furthermore, there are no signs of the [IFSRA] requesting increased 
resources. What unfortunately seems to have been lacking is professional scepticism or 
suspicion on the part of the [IFSRA] that all things might not be as well as they seemed on 
the surface (Nyberg, 2011: 63). 
This problem was exacerbated by two considerations facts referred to earlier: the statutory 
objective of the CBFSAI to promote the financial services industry in Ireland, and the increase in 
competition in the marketplace. The buccaneering attitude to loan approval adopted by Anglo 
Irish Bank, short-circuiting normal risk assessment practices, enabled it to grow at astonishing 
rates. In its 2006 Annual Report, Anglo boasted of a ‘Ten year compound annual growth rate in 
profit before tax of 39 per cent’ (Hennigan, 2010b). This put tremendous pressure on Bank of 
Ireland and AIB; one former bank executive interviewed by financial journalist Michael Lewis 
reported that they succumbed by ‘writing checks to Irish property developers to buy Irish land at 
any price’. Former Anglo Irish executives ‘spoke of their older, more respectable imitators with a 
kind of amazement. “Yes, we were out of control”, they say, in so many words. “But those guys 
were ****ing nuts”’(Lewis, 2011).  28 | P a g e  
 
This created an environment which was described by Honohan as one which placed ‘undue 
emphasis on fears of upsetting the competitive position of domestic banks and on encouraging the 
Irish financial services industry even at the expense of prudential considerations’ (Honohan, 2010: 
16). The Nyberg Commission also concluded that ‘concerns about a loss of market share by Irish 
banks to potentially less regulated foreign competitors may have inhibited forceful action by the 
[IFSRA]’ (Nyberg, 2011: 65).   
Finally, Honohan described an unwillingness on the part of the CBFSAI to acknowledge the real risk 
of a looming crisis and to pre-empt it. There appeared to be a great fear that ‘rocking the boat’ 
would lead to a potential adverse public reaction, thus ‘spoiling the party’ (Honohan, 2010: 16). 
Let us remember too that Anglo in particular was widely viewed domestically and internationally 
as a success story by the marketplace, rating agencies, politicians and the media. The Nyberg 
Commission suggested that this communal lack of judgment stemmed from the tendency to 
widespread group-think (including ‘disaster myopia’) in Irish banks during this period (Nyberg, 
2011: 87). Interestingly, it expressed the view that there was no evidence that this was more 
prevalent in Ireland than elsewhere (Nyberg, 2011: 49). This view of market pressure is consistent 
with the comment by former Citigroup CEO Chuck Prince  that ‘as long as the music is playing, 
you've got to get up and dance’ (interview in the Financial Times, 9 July 2007). But clearly the role of 
the regulator is to turn off the music before the party gets out of hand.
11 Instead, as the financial 
situation worsened and the credit institutions became less sound, ‘the earlier desire – not to rock 
                                                           
11 William McChesney Martin Jr., one-time Chairman of the Federal Reserve (1951-1970), was quoted as  
characterizing his role thus: ‘I’m the fellow who takes away the punch bowl just when the party is getting 
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the boat – was overtaken by a fear of frightening the horses’ (Honohan, 2010: 96). It is the scale of 
the myopia that is distinctive in Ireland though. The Nyberg Commission noted that ‘the extent to 
which large parts of Irish society were willing to let the good times roll on until the very last 
minute (a feature of the financial mania) may have been exceptional’ (Nyberg, 2011: ii). 
It may be therefore that the regulatory regime was not faulty in design, but that the very point of 
the system of regulation was to lower the burden of compliance, and to ensure that the legal 
requirements of risk regulation were light (Taylor, 2011: 8). Ireland sought to be a player in the 
globalized market for financial services. The International Financial Services Centre (IFSC) was a 
significant provider of employment and of tax revenues, employing over 30,000 people and 
yielding some two billion Euro in tax revenues in 2011. Its reputation as a place in which it was 
easy to do business had to be protected, indeed so much so that it had acquired the reputation 
during the 1990s as the ‘Wild West of European finance’ (O'Toole, 2012; Lavery and O'Brien, 
2005). One of the first European banks to fail in the wake of Lehman’s was Depfa Bank, an IFSC-
based subsidiary of a German bank. Its liabilities were the responsibility of its German parent; but 
the liquidity problems it experienced in 2008 were understood to have developed because of the 
freedoms available to it through its incorporation under Irish law. The IFSC’s shadow banking 
system continued to be largely unregulated even after the collapse of the domestic banking 
system, and its securitization practices were relatively unaffected by the global crash. The 
importance of the IFSC to Irish policy-makers coloured their sense of the importance of 
maintaining a regulatory distance from financial services, and this is likely also to have affected 
their sense of the regulatory requirements appropriate to the domestic banks too.  30 | P a g e  
 
We might conclude therefore that not only a consequence but also a central priority of principles-
based regulation was to maintain the threshold of intervention at a high level. It is reported that 
‘the bankers loved it, it was regulation without rules’ (Ross, 2009). Even this extraordinarily light 
regulatory regime was too much for Seán Fitzpatrick, former CEO and Chairman of Anglo Irish 
Bank, who argued in 2007 that: 
It is time to shout stop. The tide of regulation has gone far enough. We should be proud of 
our success, not suspicious of it. Our wealth creators should be rewarded and admired not 
subjected to levels of scrutiny which convicted criminals would rightly find intrusive 
(Hennigan, 2010b). 
It would not be too long before Fitzpatrick was himself arrested on suspicion of fraudulent 
behaviour. But it was too late to prevent his bank from causing enormous damage to Irish public 
life. 
Regulatory enforcement 
An essential component of any regulatory regime is an enforcement strategy to ensure 
compliance. In the period preceding the financial crisis, Honohan acknowledged that the preferred 
approach to regulatory implementation on the part of IFSRA was to seek voluntary compliance 
with legislation, codes and rules (Honohan, 2010: 43): ‘there were no sanctions imposed on credit 
institutions and none that might be said to have reflected significant prudential concerns’ 
(Honohan, 2010: , note 6 58). While IFSRA had the capacity to utilize its powers of administrative 
sanction, there was clearly a marked reluctance to apply those powers in relation to micro-
prudential functions. 31 | P a g e  
 
The hands-off role of the financial regulator in the run-up to the crisis has raised many questions 
about awareness in the regulator’s office of the extent of over-reach in the banks’ balance sheets, 
and of the scale of their reliance on the short-term interbank lending market. Honohan 
commented on the thin staffing available to the financial regulator Patrick Neary between 2006 
and early 2009. But this situation seems to have been consistent with reports that the regulator 
deliberately ‘kept on-site inspections of the banks’ books down to a minimum and gave prior 
notice in advance of such inspections’; he declared on his appointment in 2006 that ‘we will seek 
to implement the rules to the minimum extent necessary’ (Ross, 2009: 79). There was little 
evidence of the organizational and social distance normally required for effective regulatory 
enforcement. Career mobility between the boards of the Central Bank and the commercial banks 
was not uncommon, and indeed directors of both AIB and Bank of Ireland held simultaneous 
appointments on the board of the Central Bank (Clancy et al., 2010: 14; Clancy and O'Connor, 
2011: 19). Regulatory staff and bank directors often socialized together. In September 2008, 
against the backdrop of this deliberate policy of light touch regulation, Neary nevertheless: 
insisted that Anglo was not insolvent and that it had enough assets to cover its debts: ‘there 
is no evidence to suggest Anglo is insolvent on a going-concern basis. It is simply unable to 
continue on a current basis from a liquidity point of view’, he told the Taoiseach (Brennan 
and Oliver, 2010). 
From the establishment of the office of the financial regulator in 2003 to October 2008, not a 
single Irish bank had been fined as a result of an inspection. In contrast, in Britain over a 
comparable time-period, the Financial Services Authority had imposed over £14m in fines to banks 
and building societies (Ross, 2009: 81).  32 | P a g e  
 
On the other hand, some commentators have gone further and suggested that the financial 
regulator tacitly condoned some of the questionable practices of the board and senior managers 
in Anglo. In September 2008, ‘when Anglo official Willie McAteer told Patrick Neary that the bank 
would have its books in order by the end of [2008], it is claimed the former Financial Regulator 
said: “Fair play to you, Willie”’ (Oliver, 2009). At that time, the share prices of the Irish banks were 
already under sustained attack, and it was only a matter of days before the banks would find 
themselves in danger of outright insolvency. By the time the regulator began to take a tougher 
approach with the banks and indeed with their auditors, toward the end of 2008, the damage had 
long since been done. 
Nyberg suggests that the financial regulator’s reluctance to adopt a tougher line sooner can be 
explained in terms of fear of litigation – of the legal cost and reputational damage entailed by 
pressing a case against a financial institution and losing (Nyberg, 2011: 62). But potential 
reputational damage of this sort pales before the real loss of confidence in the efficacy of the 
system caused by Neary’s appearance on the current affairs programme, Prime Time, two weeks 
after the fall of Lehman Brothers. Michael Lewis comments on his performance, and quotes 
economist Colm McCarthy’s reaction to it, as follows: 
Neary, for his part, looked as if he had been dragged from a hole into which he badly 
wanted to return. He wore an insecure little mustache, stammered rote answers to 
questions he had not been asked, and ignored the ones he had been asked…. Here he was, 
on their televisions, insisting that the Irish banks were ‘resilient’ and ‘more than adequately 
capitalized’ … when everyone in Ireland could see, in the vacant skyscrapers and empty 
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insane. ‘What happened was that everyone in Ireland had the idea that somewhere in 
Ireland there was a little wise old man who was in charge of the money, and this was the 
first time they’d ever seen this little man,’ says McCarthy. ‘And then they saw him and 
said, Who the **** was that??? Is that the ****ing guy who is in charge of the 
money??? That’s when everyone panicked’ (Lewis, 2011). 
The political context of the property bubble  
Much has been written about the persistent tendency of Irish governments to engage in pro-
cyclical fiscal policy. There are many weaknesses in the institutional design of decision-making:   
governments have displayed a propensity to overheat the economy for electoral purposes during 
periods of growth, resulting in a need to take corrective action during the ensuing downturn in a 
manner that intensifies the impact of recession (Lane, 2010; Benetrix and Lane, 2009; Lane, 1998; 
Conefrey and FitzGerald, 2010; Hardiman, 2010a; Hardiman, 2010b; Honohan, 1999). By the early 
2000s, Ireland was already in the grip of another such upswing. But this time, it was amplified by 
the scale of the cheap credit available as a result of Eurozone membership.  
Government took some initiatives in the early 2000s to dampen the housing market through tax 
increases, but these were overturned as the 2002 election approached; soon afterwards, a new 
round of fiscal tightening by then Minister for Finance Charlie McCreevy was over-ruled by 
Taoiseach Bertie Ahern, again with electoral considerations in mind.. Tax incentives for property 
purchase, for commercial development as well as for individual residential purchases, were left in 
place until after the 2007 election. ‘From 2003, property seemed a one-way bet’ (Taylor, 2011: 4).  
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Why was the speculative bubble allowed to grow so rapidly, and why was government so slow to 
recognize the risks associated with untrammelled lending for property development? Two puzzles 
arise here. The first concerns the nature of the relationships between politicians, bankers, and 
builders that intensified during the housing boom. The second issue is why no-one shouted stop.   
Golden circles and the ‘cement economy’ 
During the 2000s, in Ireland as in Spain, construction activity gave a significant fillip to economic 
growth. Notwithstanding some political concern that house prices were escalating very rapidly, 
and that this even risked destabilizing the social partnership wage agreements of the early 2000s, 
the Fianna Fáil-led governments between 1997 and 2008 welcomed the employment generated, 
the revenue streams created, and the apparently unstoppable rise of Irish builders and property 
developers as major players not only at home but across Europe. This sector of Irish economic 
activity had been actively encouraged through a series of budgetary incentives (TASC, 2010). Tax 
reliefs for construction in some instances ran counter to other declared policy objectives, such as 
concentrating population growth in key towns to ensure balanced spatial development.  
Some local authorities, who controlled planning permission, proved to be the source of serious 
and systematic corruption, as developers and builders engaged in direct bribery to achieve their 
objectives (Tribunal of Inquiry, 2012; McDonald and Sheridan, 2009). But this was only one mode 
of operation. More visibly, builders and property developers sought the company of government 
ministers and others in positions of influence, socialized with them, and were conspicuously 
present at Fianna Fáil fund-raising activities such as the annual high-profile party hospitality suite 
at the Galway Races. The ‘Galway Tent’ became a byword for corrupt relations between 
politicians, banks, and property interests (O'Toole, 2010; Cooper, 2010; Leahy, 2009). A network of 35 | P a g e  
 
those with related interests developed: many of these private sector individuals were placed on 
the boards of state enterprises, and politicians were ever eager to be included in their company 
(Clancy et al., 2010; Leahy, 2009). 
A particularly striking feature of this new Irish elite was that many of them still regarded 
themselves as social outsiders. This chimed with one aspect of Fianna Fáil’s self-presentation as 
the party of workers and small farmers, harking back to its early days in the 1920s and 1930s. 
Many of the builders and property developers were self-made men with relatively little formal 
education. Former Taoiseach Bertie Ahern, who stepped down in 2008 just as the crisis was 
looming, commented later on the enormity of the developers’ losses. Since they were now 
bankrupt, their losses were close to bankrupting the whole country. Yet he spoke with unaffected 
sympathy about them as follows: 
Seán Dunne’s lost a lot of money on it. Seán’s just one of the guys. I know a lot of them, like 
(Jimmy) Flynn, (Noel) O’Flaherty and the Baileys. You meet the Baileys at Croke Park (the 
national stadium for Gaelic games) every time you go there. You can’t avoid getting a slap 
on the back going in from them. Most of these guys lost their shirt. I feel sorry for them  
(Mackay, 2012b). 
The sense of identification with the activities of Irish property developers, and of support for the 
banks who were facilitating them, also had a tinge of nationalist pride to it, particularly when Irish 
speculators engaged in high-profile British acquisitions such as the Savoy Hotel in London. One 
builder spoke of his pride in building a housing estate ‘on what was once the great Ascendancy 
estate of Castletown in Co. Kildare: “It was time the Irish went through the front gate”’, after the 36 | P a g e  
 
dispossession of his great-grandfather who belonged to the class of impoverished tenant farmers 
many of whom had been evicted from their landholdings during the nineteenth century (O'Toole, 
2010). Similarly, some of the self-made millionaires were said to feel more at home with the 
informal approach of Anglo Irish Bank than with the Bank of Ireland, which had been viewed until 
well into the 1970s as favouring employees who were members of the Church of Ireland over 
Roman Catholics (McWilliams, 2009:  ). 
As author and journalist Fintan O’Toole has noted, ‘If the control of land is left out of the equation, 
the sheer scale of the Irish property bubble is impossible to fathom’ (O'Toole, 2010). The principal 
reason for the scale of the bubble in Ireland was the price of building land. In north county Dublin, 
a prime growth region, a mere 25 owners were shown to have controlled over 50 per cent of all 
building land in 2005, enabling them to control the release of land and thereby to manipulate the 
price of property. Land costs alone rose from 10 percent of the final cost of a house to up to 50 
per cent at the peak of the boom. The cost of road development was similarly grossly distorted by 
propertied interests (O'Toole, 2010).  
Ideas and debates: why no-one shouted stop 
The Nyberg Report identified ‘a conspicuous lack of timely critical debate and analysis’ by bank 
analysts and the public at large, aligned with a sense of complacency in the Government, other 
authorities, banks and customers as a particularly Irish aspect of the crisis (Regling and Watson, 
2010: 5). Part of this may be attributed to the fact that Ireland had never experienced a serious 
property crash, and the sustained period of success led investors and regulators to become 
complacent. What was described as ‘a national speculative mania’ (Nyberg, 2011: 94) took place in 
Ireland as ‘an uncritical enthusiasm for property acquisition …became something of a national 37 | P a g e  
 
blind-spot’ (Regling and Watson, 2010: 34-5).
 There was an almost unanimous consensus that 
growth could be sustained in this manner. Dissenters were ignored, dismissed, and on occasion 
belittled. Some were even dissuaded by the apparent continued success of the credit institutions.  
It was also alleged that some stayed silent for fear of attracting possible sanctions. The Nyberg 
Commission voiced a suspicion ‘that there may have been a strong belief in Ireland that 
contrarians, non-team players, fractious observers and whistleblowers would be informally 
(though sometimes even publicly) sanctioned or ignored, regardless of the quality of their analysis 
or their place in organizations’ (Nyberg, 2011: 96-7).  
The group-think involved had many willing participants and few to offer strong counter-
arguments. External assessments of the Irish economy noted their concerns about over-heating 
and property prices. But in the absence of a European regulatory authority, they were in no 
position to warn about the dire exposure of the banking sector, and the tenor of the comments 
was on the whole favourable (O'Leary, 2010). Advice from the Department of Finance lacked input 
from skilled economic and other analysts, and although an official inquiry by Canadian Robert 
Wright gave officials the benefit of the doubt, accepting their claim that they had issued verbal 
warnings despite the signal absence of documentary evidence to this effect, other commentators 
were not so convinced (Independent Review Panel - Department of Finance, 2010; Lucey, 2011).  
This is not to say that there were no dissenting voices at all. The signs were clearly visible; some 
economists and commentators gave them vigorous voice. But the political leadership, on the 
whole, simply did not want to hear. Bertie Ahern dismissed the gathering criticism testily, saying 
‘Sitting on the sidelines, cribbing and moaning is a lost opportunity. I don’t know how people who 
engage in that don’t commit suicide because frankly the only thing that motivates me is being able 38 | P a g e  
 
to actively change something’ (RTE News, 2007). Yet later he insisted ‘I can’t remember anyone at 
any level telling me, “The banks are giving hundreds of millions of euros to developers, and they’re 
borrowing this at short rates, so if anything happens to them, they’re caught”... I know some 
people say “you should have asked”’ (Mackay, 2012a). But what the markets knew, the politicians 
should surely also have known: 
On March 17, 2007, hedge funds launched attacks on weaker quoted banks, like HBOS and 
Anglo Irish Bank. They had spotted fatal flaws in the balance sheets. The share prices of 
Ireland's financial shares plunged as opportunists in the market exploited the folly of a few 
bankers living a lie. They could read fantasy balance sheets. And yet European banks kept 
shovelling money at the guys who had gone walkabout. A stockbroker's report at the same 
time described Anglo as ‘a building society on crack’; even the normally sanguine NTMA 
boss Michael Somers admitted that he had limited his agency's exposure to Anglo. The 
warnings were everywhere, if the overseas bankers were looking for them (Ross, 2010). 
Conclusion 
The scale of the Irish financial crisis represents the destruction of a whole model of development 
that had evolved during the 2000s. Because of the guarantees provided by government to the 
domestic banks, it is also a catastrophe for ordinary Irish citizens. At the core of the disaster is the 
utter failure of the ‘light-touch’ model of regulation.  
We have considered a variety of explanations for the disasters that overtook the Irish banking 
system. Market-based corporate governance disciplines proved ineffective, and codes of practice 
associated with good corporate governance provided little resistance to the incentives to increase 39 | P a g e  
 
risky lending practices. While the structure of the regulatory system and the powers and resources 
available to the financial regulator were contributory factors, a more fundamental problem was 
that tougher regulation was not viewed as either necessary or desirable, either by the regulator’s 
office or indeed by government itself. The reasons why the regulatory failures took the form they 
did cannot be understood without acknowledging that this approach to regulation was tacitly 
endorsed by government and state officials themselves. The failures of the Irish financial system 
reflect the limitations of a particular approach to regulation. But a deeper truth emerges, which is 
that during a critical period in the 2000s, government priorities were more attentive to the 
interests of the bankers, the builders, and property developers, than they were to considerations 
of good governance. 
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